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Abstract
Corporate groups or networks, which are defined as collections of two or more
legally independent firms connected through ownership ties, are prevalent in
both developed and developing countries. The separate effects of firm central-
ity and corporate group size on firm performance have been largely discussed in
the literature. However, the effect of their interaction remains underexplored.
This paper attempts to fill the gap by introducing a new normalized measure
of firm centrality independent of corporate group size. Our empirical analysis
is based on a set of global corporate networks encompassing 17.8 million firms
and the ownership ties between them extracted from the ORBIS database in
2014. We further investigate the firm performance in the corporate networks
above by gathering financial information on 483,835 Italian firms from the
AIDA database from 2014-2016. We find a positive relationship between firm
centrality and firm performance, but the significance of the relationship de-
creases as corporate group size increases.
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1 Introduction
In a corporate group or network formed by two or more legally independent firms, the
exchange of a variety of tangible and intangible resources routinely occurs through
the ownership ties between firms. Firms’ ability to access resources highly depends on
their network positions. A firm occupying a central position in the network is likely to
have more opportunities to access resources and to benefit from knowledge spillovers
(Powell et al., 1999; Tsai, 2001; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Zaheer and Bell, 2005).
However, firms in central positions incur more costs to maintain their relational
ties. Furthermore, a high level of connectivity is sometimes considered to derail
economic performance by making firms more vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Uzzi,
1996, 1997).
In this work, we analyze the ownership networks of corporate groups, which are de-
fined as confederations of legally independent firms linked by multiplex ties (Almeida
and Wolfenzon, 2006; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010; Belenzon et al., 2013) and be-
longing to the same owner(s) (Belenzon et al., 2017; Cainelli and Iacobucci, 2011;
Cainelli et al., 2006). Firms can exchange financial capital, knowledge and manage-
rial skills with other firms in the same group through ownership links (Blomström
and Sjöholm, 1999; Markusen, 1995). However, some studies argue that a corpo-
rate group with diversified affiliates may have problems due to weak disclosure re-
quirements, ineffective governance mechanisms, and a poorly developed market for
corporate control (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998).
In the literature, the effects of firm positions in the corporate network and of the
group-level features on firm performance have been widely discussed, but the re-
lationship between their interaction and firm performance remains underexplored.
Although a more central firm in large groups can gain more access to resources, it
is more likely to confront higher costs of acquiring and communicating knowledge
(Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012) and governance frictions, which can reduce the
effectiveness of central control (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1998; Patacconi, 2009). The
possible trade-off effect may make central firms in a large corporate group benefit
less than expected.
Through an empirical analysis, our research contributes to the literature by com-
bining firm-level centrality and corporate group size and exploring the relationship
between their interplay and firm performance. Furthermore, we provide a novel
centrality measure to evaluate a firm’s position in the ownership network. The mea-
sure is based on the harmonic centrality (Newman, 2003; Rochat, 2009; Schilling
and Phelps, 2007), which can avoid the infinite path length problem in a network
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composed of disconnected components. However, the harmonic centrality value of
a certain node is highly correlated with the component size in which the firm is lo-
cated. Given this drawback, our measure adopts a normalization method to reduce
the effect of the component size. In this way, we make the centrality measure more
comparable across components (i.e., business groups of different sizes).
Our analysis is focused on Italian firms. We select Italy in this study for a number of
reasons. First, the data on ownership relationships (and hence corporate networks)
from ORBIS are difficult to cross-link over years (due to the annual updates of the
database and the resulting changes in the firm identifiers). In our case, as we will
discuss in detail in Subsection 3.1, we have collected the data on corporate networks
in 2014 and firm performance such as sales from 2014-2016. A valid empirical analysis
would therefore require that the corporate networks remain reasonably stable over
the 2014-2016 period. In this regard, Italy and some other European countries
have experienced a severe debt crisis since the end of 2009. The real GDP growth
rate of Italy1 had been ranked in the last 5 EU countries for 3 consecutive years
since 2012. Figure 4 in the appendix shows that the Italian economy was shocked
by the crisis since 2011, and the GDP growth rate only turned positive again in
2014. During the crisis, skepticism about the availability of equity capital, as a main
determinant, results in a decrease in the volume of mergers and acquisitions at the
global level (Kostić, 2013), and the ownership structure of most corporate groups
remained stable.
Another reason to study Italian firms is that corporate groups, especially those con-
trolled by a person or a group of family members, are common in Italy (Corbetta and
Tomaselli, 1996; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008). In 2014, according to our dataset of
global corporate networks, the number of Italian-owned corporate groups is ranked
in the top 10 countries worldwide.
Finally, Italy is one of the few countries for which ORBIS by Bureau van Dijk (BvD)
provides more complete data, with a coverage of at least 40% of aggregate employ-
ment (McGowan et al., 2017). Therefore, we believe that Italy is a representative
country to conduct our research.
We manually download the shareholder data for 17.8 million global firms in 2014 from
the ORBIS database. Based on their direct inter-firm shareholding relationships, we
construct the global ownership network. Then, we restrict our sample to Italian firms
and identify 483,835 Italian firms from the global ownership network and collect their
financial accounts data from 2014 to 2016 in AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata Delle
1Data source: world bank https://data.worldbank.org/.
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Aziende Italiane), which is the Italian subset of ORBIS and is more convenient for
data collection than the full version of ORBIS. Then, we empirically analyze firm
centrality, corporate group size and the relationship between their interaction and
firm performance, which, in our main model, is measured as the 3-year average sales
growth rate. The results show a positive relationship between firm centrality and
performance in small corporate groups but not always in larger corporate groups.
A possible explanation for the findings is that although firms in central positions in
larger corporate groups can facilitate access to funds and information, they are also
faced with higher coordination costs than those in small groups.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical
framework of our research. Section 3 introduces the sample, centrality and corporate
group size measure and the econometric specifications. In Section 4, we present some
descriptive statistics of the data and then provide the estimation results and analysis.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the work.
2 Theoretical Framework
The past two decades have seen a surge of interest in applying network theory to
organizational studies due to a growing awareness of complexity in business (Bor-
gatti and Halgin, 2011; Carpenter et al., 2012; Vasconcelos and Ramirez, 2011). In
organizational network theory, a vast body of literature has investigated the effect
of firm position and network complexity on firm performance, especially in the con-
text of inter-firm networks (Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). In an
inter-firm network, firms are connected through a variety of relationships such as col-
laboration (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati et al., 2000), interlocking
directorates (Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer and Bell, 2005), ownership (Almeida and Wolfenzon,
2006; Kali and Sarkar, 2011) and credit (Peterson and Rajan, 1994).
Our work is related to the literature on corporate groups’ ownership network and
firm performance. Corporate groups exhibit approximately a pyramidal structure
in which one or more layers of firms are controlled by the same ultimate owner
either directly or through a holding company (Cainelli and Iacobucci, 2011; Goto,
1982). Due to the availability of worldwide shareholding data in recent years, a
growing body of research has explored the global ownership network (Glattfelder,
2010; Vitali and Battiston, 2011; Vitali et al., 2011). Existing studies discuss the
inter-firm network generally from two perspectives: the individual firm level and the
network level (Provan et al., 2007). Although some works have considered the factors
of both levels, the relationship between their interplay and firm performance remains
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unclear. Our research attempts to fill the gap by combining both the individual-level
and network-level factors in the analysis.
2.1 Firm-level Centrality
Many studies have discussed the benefits of network centrality for a firm. Because
network links facilitate the sharing of financial capital (Belenzon and Berkovitz,
2010), superior knowledge and managerial skills (Bernstein and Mohnen, 1998; Markusen,
1995) among firms in the corporate group, a firm occupying a central position in the
network has more opportunities to access diversified knowledge and resources (Powell
et al., 1996; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) and generate more innovations than the periph-
eral firms (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Soh, 2003). However, despite the benefits
of network ties, a high level of connectivity is sometimes considered to constrain the
adaptability of firms and make them vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Uzzi, 1996,
1997).
In the literature, diverse measures are used to identify a firm’s network position.
Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) and Powell et al. (1996) have used closeness centrality,
which measures how central a firm is relative to other firms, including both direct and
indirect partners. Closeness centrality also measures the firm’s reachability to every
other firm with the fewest number of intermediate firms. Schilling and Phelps (2007)
employ the betweenness centrality measure as a control variable, but its effect on sub-
sequent firm patenting fails to achieve statistical significance in any of the estimated
models. Mani and Moody (2014) measure a firm’s position using mesolevel net-
work structure indicators: disconnected periphery, isolated cluster, small world and
nested world. They find that firms residing in the nested core have more multiplex
ties and larger transaction volumes than firms in the small world or the disconnected
periphery. In recent work, Kwon et al. (2016) also adopts the closeness centrality
to measure how closely connected a firm is to the rest of the organizations in the
inter-firm network, but they have not found evidence to support that the influence
of national trust on alliance governance will decrease as a firm increases its centrality
in the international alliance network.
Our research contributes to the literature by providing a novel centrality measure
that is based on the harmonic closeness centrality (Newman, 2003; Rochat, 2009).
An advantage of the harmonic centrality is that it can avoid the infinite path length
problem compared with the traditional closeness centrality. However, the harmonic
centrality value of a node is highly correlated with the size of the component in which
it is located. Given this drawback, our measure adopts a normalization method to
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reduce the effect of the component size. By doing so, we make the centrality measure
more comparable across components of different sizes. In the case of ownership
networks, we can better assess how central a firm is in a corporate group of any
size.
2.2 Group-level Measures
Another strand of literature focuses on network-level features and attempts to un-
derstand the impact of structures and behaviors on individual organizations (Ahuja,
2000; Powell et al., 1996; Provan et al., 2007). Some recent works have developed
novel measures to characterize the complexity of a corporate group’s hierarchical
structure. Altomonte and Rungi (2013) provide a specific entropy-like measure of
organizational complexity of hierarchical chains and find a non-linear relationship
between hierarchical complexity and productivity. Belenzon et al. (2013) develop a
pyramidal index (PI) that measures the distribution of firms by ownership layers.
They find that Anglo groups have the most vertical hierarchical structure, while the
Swiss groups have the most horizontal structures. Mahmood et al. (2017) adopt
the intergroup network centralization measure introduced in Freeman (1978) and
demonstrate that centralization of equity ties enhances subsidiary performance, but
these effects are weakened when the environment becomes turbulent.
Existing studies have emphasized the role of individual positions in the network
and group-level features on firm performance, but the relationship between their
interaction and firm performance remains largely unknown. Although a central firm
in a large corporate group can gain more access to information, it faces possibly
higher costs of acquiring and communicating knowledge (Altomonte and Rungi, 2013;
Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012) and governance frictions, which can reduce the
effectiveness of central control (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1998; Patacconi, 2009). The
possible trade-off effect may make a central firm in a large corporate group benefit
less than expected.
3 Method
3.1 Data and Sample
We derive the ownership data from BvD’s ORBIS database. ORBIS is the largest
and most widely used firm-level database, which captures information on companies,
especially private ones, from a wide range of sources. The ORBIS database covers
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information on 17,842,618 global firms’ equity ownership structure in 2014.2 For
each firm, there is at least one observation of its direct shareholders, and we collect
each of its owners’ IDs 3 and the ownership shares (see the details of the data form
in Table 1). Firms can have multiple direct shareholders, such as firms E and H in
Table 1. In total, there were initially 25,635,140 observations, and each firm had, on
average, 1.44 direct shareholders.
A strand of studies builds the inter-firm ownership network based on the majority
rule (Altomonte and Rungi, 2013; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010; UNCTAD, 2016).
In ORBIS, 81.2% of the firms are owned by majority shareholders. Their ownership
links (shares > 50%), representing 56.53% of all the links (see Table 2), are used
to build the ownership network in our study.4 For example, the 5th and 9th rows
in Table 2 are dropped in our study. For each observation, we construct a directed
link from the shareholder to the firm. Based on Table 2, for example, a directed
link starting from shareholder A to firm B is built for the first observation, and then
another link from shareholder B to firm C is built for the second observation, and so
on. Some firms in the same corporate group may share the same direct owner. For
example, in Table 2, firms B, D, E, and J are all owned by firm A in the corporate
group. All firms that belong to the same corporate group are thus connected through
ownership links. As shown in Table 2, firm A is the parent firm of the corporate
group and controls all the other subsidiaries, and the ownership structure of each
corporate group can be depicted as a hierarchy.5 Because there is no ownership link
2We download the data on all the firms provided with ownership information by ORBIS in
January 2015.
3BvD identifies each company by a unique ID. The BvD ID number incorporates either the
national ID number or the ID provided by their information providers (IP). According to BvD,
the ID numbers may change when the national ID numbers change in the official data sources or
the BvD IPs decide to switch their ID numbers. In Italy, the BvD ID may change if the company
changes address.
4We also use two other methods to build the ownership network in which minority control is
considered. If a firm has no majority owner, we rank all its shareholders by their shares r1, r2, r3, · · · .
In one method, we retain the link from the top-ranking shareholder if its share is larger than the
sum of the shares of the second and the third ranking shareholders, that is, r1 > r2 + r3. Similarly,
in the other method, we retain the link from the top-ranking shareholder if its share is larger
than the sum of the shares of the second, the third and the fourth ranked shareholders, that is,
r1 > r2 + r3 + r4.
5Due to data restrictions, we cannot distinguish the ownership by entities, states, individuals or
families. Therefore, the one located at the top of each corporate ownership structure can be either
a parent company whose shareholders are not provided by ORBIS or all have minority ownership
or the individual who is the ultimate beneficial owner of the corporate group. See more details in
6.4.
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among firms in different corporate groups, the global network can be divided into
disconnected network components.6
According to the approach we use to build the ownership network, each firm has
one shareholder except the ultimate owner, which has no shareholder. Thus, the
number of entities in each corporate group is equal to the number of links plus 1,
and the number of nodes in the global ownership network is equal to the number
of links plus the number of components. The global ownership network consists of
25,681,483 nodes, 14,492,929 links and 11,188,554 components.7 In total, 96.32% of
the components contain fewer than 4 nodes, while only 0.05% of them contain more
than 50 nodes (i.e., firms). The largest component includes 8,419 nodes.
As mentioned above, we then restrict our sample to Italian firms. In our data,
Italian-owned corporate groups represent 3.46% of all the corporate groups, ranking
8th among all countries.8 We collect the non-consolidated financial balance sheet
data of Italian firms from AIDA, which is the Italian subset of ORBIS. We use AIDA
instead of the full version of ORBIS because the former provides more convenient
queries tailored for Italy and therefore faster data retrieval processes. It contains
information on all Italian companies obliged to submit their balance sheets. We
extract the data on 1,164,871 active Italian firms in all sectors and regions in 2014.9
Among all these Italian firms provided by AIDA in 2014, we identify 483,835 in the
global ownership network, which is built using the data from ORBIS10. These Italian
firms belong to 372,109 components. Each of them contains at least one Italian firm,
6Because the individual majority shareholders cannot be identified in the data, some groups of
size 2 are actually composed of a standalone firm and its individual shareholders. We perform a
new algorithm to filter out these possible links. See more details in 6.4 in the appendix.
7The network built using the other two methods is composed of 26,266,255 nodes, 14,873,254
links for the definition r1 > r2 + r3, and 26,168,532 nodes, 14,814,218 links for the definition
r1 > r2 + r3 + r4.
8In our data, the 10 most frequent countries where the ultimate owners of all the corporate groups
are located include United States (12.34%), Russia (9.43%), Norway (4.96%), Poland (4.90%),
Australia (4.88%), Germany (4.71%), Bulgaria (4.25%), Italy (3.46%), Romania (2.50%) and Spain
(1.51%).
9In February 2016, we downloaded the Italian firms’ balance sheet data for the year 2014. In
2017, we further downloaded their balance sheet data for the years 2015-2016, but some firms were
no longer found in AIDA. See the descriptive statistics in Table 3.
10We first match the Italian firms in AIDA with those in the original ORBIS ownership databases
by their BvD ID and identify 711,393 firms. Considering that some of them may change the BvD
ID number, we further match the rest of the firms by their names and identify 7,751 firms. In total,
we find 719,144 Italian firms with ownership information in AIDA. However, 235,309 of them have
no majority owners. According to our definition, we cannot identify which corporate group these
firms belong to. Finally, we retain 483,835 Italian firms for further analysis.
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Figure 1: The Ownership Structure of a Large Corporate Group
and some of them also contain foreign firms. Only 25 of these groups are composed
of more than 1,000 firms (see an example in Figure 1), and the largest one contains
3,260 firms.
Our final sample of data is subject to several limitations. First, we have only cross-
sectional data on the ownership structure, which is standard in the literature because
it is difficult to trace its change over time. Due to this restriction, we cannot properly
test the causal effect of centrality on corporate performance.
Second, we have limited information about the shareholders in the current data. As
a result, a corporate group defined in our work may also include its ultimate benefi-
cial owner who controls the parent company. Although it is necessary to distinguish
different types of ownership, how to address the ultimate individual or family bene-
ficial owners requires more attention in future work. If firms are directly controlled
by the same ultimate beneficial owner(s), they can be viewed as members of a group
rather than independent because their business can be related in some way. Cainelli
and Iacobucci (2011) and Belenzon et al. (2017) define these firms as members of a
corporate group. In the case of Italy, corporate groups controlled by family are quite
common (Corbetta and Tomaselli, 1996; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008), and more
attention should be paid to this type of corporate group.
Finally, in our data, we have only the balance sheet data for Italian domestic firms
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but not for the foreign firms in these corporate groups. Additionally, existing studies
control the average performance of all firms within a corporate group.11 We will add
these group-level measures in the future once the data are available. Moreover, with
the financial data on firms in other countries, we can also extend our analysis to the
global scale and explore the difference in firm performance in different countries.
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Dependent Variable
Sales growth is a widely used indicator of firm performance (Brush et al., 2000; Collins
and Clark, 2003), which reflects how well an organization relates to the environment
by successfully expanding its market scope (Ansoff, 1965; Dess and Robinson, 1984;
Hofer and Schendel, 1978). We use the 3-year (2014-2016) average sales growth
rate as the dependent variable. As a robustness check, we also use the logarithm




Given that the ownership network is directed, the firms that control no subsidiaries
in a corporate group have no connecting path to other firms. Newman (2003) and
Rochat (2009) have introduced harmonic centrality, which can avoid this problem by
considering the reciprocal of the distance. The definition of the harmonic centrality






, where dij is the number of links in a shortest path connecting node i to node j. If
node i has no path to node j, their distance is considered infinity, and the reciprocal
is thus zero. Therefore, a node that has no path to any other node in the network
has a centrality value of zero.
We notice that nodes in a large component are prone to have larger harmonic cen-
trality values. To reduce the effect of component size on centrality value, we provide
a novel measure that normalizes the harmonic centrality to the interval [0, 1]. By
11On the positive side, however, by focusing on a single country, we avoid comparing financial
data across jurisdictions that are subject to different accounting rules.
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doing so, we make it more comparable when assessing how central a firm is across
corporate groups of different sizes.





where ni is the component size, that is, the number of nodes in the component
to which node i belongs. g(ni) is any component of size ni. Given a component
of size ni, the largest possible value of centrality is reached when a node is directly
connected to all the other ni−1 nodes. In a directed graph 12, the minimal centrality




In our case, ni is the number of firms in the corporate group to which firm i belongs.
Given a corporate group of size ni, the largest possible value of centrality is reached
when the ultimate owner directly controls all the ni−1 subsidiaries. The comparison
of harmonic and normalized centrality values of three examples is illustrated in Figure
2 and 3.
It should be noted that although our sample is restricted to Italian firms, 9.9% of
these firms are in multinational groups. Because our centrality measure reflects a
firm’s position in the corporate group, the number of steps in the network between
an Italian firm and a foreign firm in the same corporate group is also taken into
account when computing the centrality.
Another (reverse) centrality measure of a firm is simply counting its distance from
the ultimate owner (Belenzon et al., 2017). By analyzing the data on the struc-
ture of corporate groups in Western Europe, Belenzon et al. (2017) find that the
focal subsidiaries with greater organizational distance from parent companies have
12We build the ownership network based on the control relationship among firms; thus, the
direction of the ownership link is taken into account. If we ignore the direction and treat the
network as an undirected one, the minimal possible centrality is reached when the component is
a chain. The node at either end of the chain has the minimal centrality value, which is equal to∑ni−1
k=1
1













Figure 2: Original Harmonic Centrality Figure 3: Normalized Harmonic Centrality
lower sales growth rates and that their performance is more similar to that of the
matched standalone firms in response to changing industry conditions. They call the
simple measure the ownership level, which is defined as the number of intermediate
subsidiaries separating a focal subsidiary from the parent company.13
Corporate Group Size
We take the number of firms in a corporate group to measure group size14 (Belenzon
et al., 2017; Del Prete and Rungi, 2015). Because this measure has a long-tailed
distribution, we perform a log transformation to reduce the variance. Another mea-
sure of corporate group size is the diameter of the network. Diameter is defined as
the longest of all the shortest paths in a network, which in our case is a corporate
group. For example, among all the shortest paths, the longest distances of the three
prototypes in Figure 3 are 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Watts and Strogatz (1998) and
Barabási and Albert (1999) argue that the diameter of a network increases logarith-
mically with the addition of new nodes. Hence, it can be viewed as a proxy for the
logarithm of the number of firms in a corporate group.
Control Variables
13Belenzon et al. (2017) further add 1 to the number. They also replace the values of ownership
levels larger than 6 with 6.
14Because the ownership network of each corporate group identified by our algorithm may include
the individual ultimate owner, the actual number of firms in a group can be 1 less than the number
of nodes in its network. We make some further efforts to identify the possible individual ultimate
owners. See the details in 6.4 in the appendix.
12
The covariates include the firm-level factors in 2014, such as number of employ-
ees, capital intensity, firm age, whether the corporate group is multinational (mne
dummy), dummies of sectors and regions in Italy. When we use the 3-year sales
growth rate as the dependent variable, we also control the logarithm form of sales in
2014.
In addition, we use the pyramidal index (PI) introduced by Belenzon et al. (2013)
as a control variable. The index reflects the extent to which the organization of
subsidiaries is hierarchical by measuring the distribution of subsidiaries at different




#Affiliates−1 , where N is
the largest number of steps to the ultimate owner, sharei is the ratio of the number
of subsidiaries that are located at level i to the total number of subsidiaries in the
group, and #Affiliates is the number of subsidiaries in the group. The value of
PI varies from 0 to 1. The higher value indicates that the group structure is more
hierarchical. Aghion and Tirole (1997) argue that the hierarchical structures in which
decision-making responsibility over non-routine tasks is delegated to local managers
result in better decisions.
3.3 Empirical Models
We first explore the overall relationship between firm performance, firm centrality
and group size through the following linear regression model:
Yi = α + β1 centralityi + β2 logCG sizej + γ
′
Zi + εi (2)
where Yi is the performance of firm i, and j is the corporate group to which firm i
belongs. Zi are the aforementioned covariates. Because the performance of the firm
within the same corporate group can be correlated, we relax the assumption of the
independence of residuals. Instead, we use the cluster-robust standard errors in the
estimation by controlling the component to which they belong.
Second, we examine the relationship between firm centrality and performance given
group size. To guarantee that each subsample has enough observations, we merge
some corporate groups of different sizes into few intervals. We run the regression
model 2 separately over the subsamples, dropping the term logCG sizej.
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4 Results and Discussion
We report the summary statistics of the variables in Table 3 and their correlation
matrix in Table 4.
We then perform a linear regression model to explore the relationship between firm
performance and the interaction of centrality and corporate group size. Table 5
reports the main regression results.15 First, note that the coefficient of the owner-
ship level, as a simple measure of centrality, is significant and negative in the first
three specifications. Correspondingly, the coefficient of our centrality measure is
also significant and positive in all the specifications, controlling for the number of
firms in the corporate group or diameter to measure group size, with or without the
PI16 measure. The results show that both firm centrality and group size are gener-
ally positively correlated with sales growth. Table 8 and Table 10 in the appendix
present the results using value added per labor and sales per labor as a performance
measure, and the results are consistent. Note that the coefficients of other control
variables such as the number of employees, capital intensity, firm age, and whether
the corporate group is multinational all have the expected signs. Also note the high
correlation between the two measures of corporate group size. As shown in Table 4,
the correlation between the diameter and the logarithm form of the number of firms
in the corporate group is as high as 0.946, which is in line with the theory in Watts
and Strogatz (1998) and Barabási and Albert (1999).
In the following analysis, we use only our measure of centrality. Note that in the
last specification, where we combine the ownership level and our measure, only ours
remains significant. Compared with the ownership level, our centrality measure re-
solves the problem of its high collinearity with group size. It is also more informative
because it takes into account the number of steps from a focal firm to all its direct
and indirect controlling subsidiaries, which reflects to a certain extent the firmÕs
coordinating power in the group’s ownership network.
15All regression results are based on the majority control network. The results of the other
two definitions of network are consistent and available upon request. In the regression model, the
observations with the values of their dependent variable lying in the 1% tail of the distribution are
excluded. We also conduct a robustness check by dropping the observations in the 5% tail of the
distribution, and the results are similar and hence not reported here.
16The results in the rest of the paper are reduced to the sample of firms making part of groups
of size larger than 2. On the one hand, the PI measure requires that the corporate groups have
at least three companies. On the other hand, due to data restrictions, some groups of size 2 in
our algorithm can be composed of an individual ultimate owner and a company. See 6.4 in the
appendix for more details.
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We further explore the relationship between firm centrality and performance given
the group size17. To guarantee that each subsample has enough observations, we
divide the firms according to the following intervals of group size: [3, 5], [6, 7], [8,
13], [14, 50], [50, +∞. The results are shown in Table 6. We notice that the coefficient
of centrality is significant and positive when the component size is smaller than 6.
Table 9 and 11 in the appendix show the results using the other two performance
measures. We find that when the corporate group size is larger than 7, the coefficient
of centrality is either not significant or sometimes even negative. The results imply
that the centrality of Italian firms in the ownership network and their performance
during the crisis are positively correlated if the corporate group size is smaller than
8.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have empirically investigated the relationship between the interac-
tion of firm centrality and corporate group size and firm performance. Specifically,
we have found a positive and significant relationship between firm centrality and per-
formance for small corporate groups. However, the significance of the relationship
decreases as the group size increases. Previous studies have found mixed results on
the effects of firms’ network positions for their economic and innovative performances
(Kwon et al., 2016; Mani and Moody, 2014; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). That is,
being central in the corporate network can be performance-enhancing because of the
closeness to valuable resources (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Powell et al., 1996;
Soh, 2003; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) as well as performance-worsening because of
the exposure to costs and risks (Uzzi, 1996, 1997). To help resolve the conflicting
results, our study has identified corporate group size as an important dimension
along which the positive effect of network centrality on firm performance varies. The
findings suggest that there may exist a trade-off of performance for firms at central
positions in large corporate groups. Though they can facilitate access to funds and
information, they may face higher coordination costs and become more vulnerable
to external shocks than if they were in small groups, which cancels out the positive
effect. Therefore, efforts should be made to reduce the costs and risks induced by
direct and indirect ownership links to retain the performance ‘premium’ of centrality
in a corporate network.
Our contribution to the literature on the ownership network of corporate groups is
17Because the log number of firms is highly correlated with the diameter, we use only the former
to measure corporate group size here and below.
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at least twofold. First, we provide a new measure of centrality. Considering that
the ownership level measure used in Belenzon et al. (2017) has a high correlation
with group size, we adopt the normalized harmonic centrality measure to neutralize
the size effect. Consequently, we make centrality more comparable across groups of
different sizes. Second, although the effects of individual-level centrality and group-
level complexity on firm performance have been separately studied and discussed
in the literature, the relationship between their interaction and firm performance is
largely unclear. The practical issue might be the difficulty of disentangling the effect
of centrality from that of corporate group size. As mentioned above, our normalized
harmonic centrality measure is used in this paper to address the issue. By performing
a detailed analysis with multiple robustness checks, we found that the relationship
between firm centrality and firm performance depends on corporate group size.
Finally, the robustness of the results can be further tested after more data are col-
lected across countries and over time. Some particularly interesting extensions in-
clude a replication study of another country with different institutional arrangements
and corporate culture from Italy and a dynamic analysis before and after a significant
economic event, such as the 2007-08 financial crisis.
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Table 1: Example of the Data
mark firm direct owner ownership shares
1 B A 100%
2 C B 100%
3 D A 97%
4 E A 79.35%
5 E K 20.65%
6 F E 95%
7 G F 100%
8 H F 90%
9 H L 10%
10 I H 100%
11 J A 100%
Table 2: Distribution of Direct Ownership Share
ownership share frequency percentage
(0, 25%] 3,997,584 15.59%
(25%, 50%] 7,144,627 27.87%
(50%, 75%] 3,615,425 14.10%
(75%, 100%] 10,877,504 42.43%
Total 25,635,140 100.00%
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variables N mean sd p10 p50 p90
centrality 483,835 0.0628 0.215 0 0 0
ownership level 483,831 1.098 0.535 1 1 2
No. employees 2014 395,395 14.15 167.1 1 3 18
No. firms in CG 483,835 14.53 109.0 2 2 6
diameter 483,835 1.674 1.592 1 1 3
PI 159,883 0.228 0.341 0 0.0105 1
fixed assets 2014 396,357 1,641 79,799 0 33 1,554
capital intensity 2014 395,025 370.7 5,675 0 7.250 438
age 483,751 14.27 12.39 3 10 31
mne 483,835 0.0987 0.298 0 0 0
value added 2014 396,730 912.9 21,688 -7 67 897
VA per labor 2014 395,395 45.26 700.0 -5.069 22.20 80
sales 2014 396,590 4,265 111,372 0 256 3,630
sales per labor 2014 395,255 229.6 2,304 0 76 380
3-year (2014-2016) sales growth rate 228,168 0.373 9.393 -0.212 0.0254 0.399
23


































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Regression Results of Centrality and Corporate Group Size
Dependent variable: 3-year average sales growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth
ownership level -0.00812*** -0.00493* -0.00446* 0.00451
(0.00251) (0.00255) (0.00266) (0.00293)
centrality 0.0556*** 0.0450*** 0.0443*** 0.0507***
(0.00451) (0.00728) (0.00727) (0.00832)
(log) No. firms 0.0124*** 0.00565* 0.0111*** 0.00533**
(0.00314) (0.00308) (0.00248) (0.00262)
PI 0.0178*** 0.0157*** 0.00418 0.00255 -0.00166
(0.00540) (0.00521) (0.00522) (0.00516) (0.00586)
diameter 0.00225 0.00210* 0.00120
(0.00145) (0.00118) (0.00136)
(log) No. employees 0.0471*** 0.0412*** 0.0412*** 0.0462*** 0.0403*** 0.0403*** 0.0403***
(0.00145) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00144) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227)
(log) capital intensity 0.00521*** 0.00406*** 0.00409*** 0.00454*** 0.00346*** 0.00350*** 0.00351***
(0.000544) (0.000904) (0.000905) (0.000544) (0.000907) (0.000908) (0.000909)
(log) sales 2014 -0.0595*** -0.0530*** -0.0530*** -0.0604*** -0.0535*** -0.0534*** -0.0535***
(0.00130) (0.00207) (0.00206) (0.00131) (0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00207)
mne 0.0398*** 0.0288*** 0.0319*** 0.0345*** 0.0254*** 0.0287*** 0.0279***
(0.00414) (0.00502) (0.00470) (0.00415) (0.00508) (0.00475) (0.00477)
age -0.00160*** -0.00115*** -0.00115*** -0.00168*** -0.00121*** -0.00122*** -0.00121***
(8.04e-05) (0.000133) (0.000132) (8.16e-05) (0.000135) (0.000135) (0.000135)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.407*** 0.379*** 0.381*** 0.408*** 0.381*** 0.384*** 0.381***
(0.00722) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.00699) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0128)
Observations 225,717 72,127 72,127 225,721 72,127 72,127 72,127
R-squared 0.035 0.029 0.029 0.035 0.030 0.030 0.030
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Regression Results of Subsamples by Corporate Group Sizes
Dependent variable: 3-year average sales growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Size 3-5 Size 6-7 Size 8-13 Size 14-50 Size 50+
centrality 0.0625*** -0.0194 0.0403 0.0383 0.00221
(0.00890) (0.0178) (0.0247) (0.0278) (0.0456)
PI 0.00488 -0.00987 -0.00342 -0.0325 0.342
(0.00546) (0.0313) (0.0397) (0.0751) (0.253)
(log) No. employees 0.0417*** 0.0413*** 0.0307*** 0.0266*** 0.0397***
(0.00304) (0.00716) (0.00754) (0.00707) (0.00567)
(log) capital intensity 0.00291** 0.00828*** 0.00233 0.00396 0.00336
(0.00117) (0.00282) (0.00287) (0.00291) (0.00244)
(log) sales 2014 -0.0598*** -0.0457*** -0.0435*** -0.0407*** -0.0448***
(0.00268) (0.00627) (0.00697) (0.00717) (0.00562)
age -0.00148*** -0.000633* -0.000839* -0.000821** -0.000771*
(0.000145) (0.000374) (0.000458) (0.000339) (0.000434)
mne 0.0240*** 0.0189 -0.0106 0.0372** 0.0944***
(0.00700) (0.0131) (0.0128) (0.0160) (0.0201)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.436*** 0.305*** 0.326*** 0.308*** 0.210***
(0.0162) (0.0400) (0.0441) (0.0518) (0.0417)
Observations 49,058 5,745 5,698 6,003 5,623
R-squared 0.035 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.028
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6 Appendix
Figure 4: Real GDP Growth Rate of Some European Countries
6.1 Variables Definitions
27
Table 7: Variables Definitions
Variables Definition
3-year sales growth rate (
∑2015
i=2014(salesi+1 − salesi)/salesi)/2.
centrality A measure of firm’s centrality in a corporate group.
CG size The number of firms that belong to a corporate group.
diameter The longest of all the shortest paths in a network.
VA per labor value added/No. employees in 2014.
sales per labor sales/No. employees in 2014.
capital intensity fixed assets/No. employees in 2014.
mne A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a multinational group, and 0 otherwise.
ownership level The number of subsidiaries separating a focal subsidiary from the parent company.
PI The pyramidal index defined by Belenzon et al. (2013).
sectors A set of dummy variables that equal 1 if a firm belongs to a certain sector, and
sector 4 is used as a benchmark in the regression.
1: Agriculture, forestry and fishing.
2: Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry.
3: Construction.
4: Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and
food service activities.
5: Information and communication.
6: Financial and insurance activities.
7: Real estate activities (including imputed rents of owner-occupied dwellings).
8: Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities.
9: Public administration, defense, education, human health and social work activities.
10: Other services.
regions A set of dummy variables that takes a value of 1 if a firm belongs to a






6.2 Robustness Check 1: Using Value Added per labor as
the Dependent Variable
Table 8: Regression Results of Centrality and Different CG Size Measures
Dependent variable: log VA per labor
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
centrality 0.244*** 0.239*** 0.114*** 0.111***
(0.00855) (0.00863) (0.0142) (0.0143)






(log) No. employees 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.00247) (0.00238) (0.00385) (0.00373)
(log) capital intensity 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.152*** 0.153***
(0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00187) (0.00186)
age 0.00303*** 0.00301*** 0.00153*** 0.00149***
(0.000168) (0.000168) (0.000273) (0.000272)
mne 0.151*** 0.180*** 0.195*** 0.223***
(0.0119) (0.0108) (0.0150) (0.0130)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.254*** 2.273*** 2.556*** 2.578***
(0.00985) (0.00806) (0.0211) (0.0178)
Observations 285,303 285,303 88,065 88,065
R-squared 0.239 0.238 0.199 0.199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Regression Results of Subsamples by Corporate Group Sizes
Dependent variable: (log) VA per labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CG size 3-5 CG size 6-7 CG size 8-13 CG size 14-50 CG size 50+
centrality 0.156*** 0.150*** -0.0687 -0.0516 -0.239*
(0.0159) (0.0432) (0.0485) (0.0568) (0.122)
PI 0.0655*** 0.0856 0.00947 0.305 3.283***
(0.0106) (0.0655) (0.0935) (0.207) (0.870)
(log) No. employees 0.163*** 0.0688*** 0.0450*** 0.0286*** 0.119***
(0.00360) (0.00917) (0.00935) (0.0103) (0.0121)
(log) capital intensity 0.163*** 0.148*** 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.112***
(0.00206) (0.00606) (0.00630) (0.00673) (0.0100)
age 0.00175*** 0.000838 -0.000332 0.00153* 0.00338***
(0.000305) (0.000811) (0.000599) (0.000846) (0.000956)
mne 0.128*** 0.154*** 0.194*** 0.209*** 0.391***
(0.0145) (0.0299) (0.0290) (0.0520) (0.121)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.486*** 2.922*** 3.118*** 3.281*** 2.745***
(0.0142) (0.0504) (0.0580) (0.0828) (0.143)
Observations 61,742 6,905 6,621 6,555 6,242
R-squared 0.194 0.179 0.166 0.146 0.154
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6.3 Robustness Check 2: Using Sales per labor as Depen-
dent Variable
Table 10: Regression Results of Centrality and Different CG Size Measures
Dependent variable: log sales per labor
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
centrality 0.284*** 0.280*** 0.147*** 0.145***
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0166) (0.0167)






(log) No. employees 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.124*** 0.124***
(0.00271) (0.00268) (0.00405) (0.00400)
(log) capital intensity 0.0985*** 0.0987*** 0.100*** 0.100***
(0.00121) (0.00120) (0.00211) (0.00211)
age 0.00330*** 0.00327*** 0.00189*** 0.00185***
(0.000191) (0.000191) (0.000325) (0.000324)
mne 0.201*** 0.226*** 0.221*** 0.243***
(0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0159) (0.0140)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.064*** 4.081*** 4.147*** 4.164***
(0.00992) (0.00851) (0.0215) (0.0193)
Observations 305,117 305,117 94,761 94,761
R-squared 0.158 0.157 0.151 0.150
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Regression Results of Subsamples by Corporate Group Sizes
Dependent variable: (log) sales per labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Size 3-5 Size 6-7 Size 8-13 Size 14-50 Size 50+
centrality 0.181*** 0.165*** 0.0195 0.0436 -0.279*
(0.0193) (0.0509) (0.0530) (0.0679) (0.159)
PI 0.0475*** -0.00566 -0.0269 0.107 4.374***
(0.0128) (0.0793) (0.116) (0.235) (0.971)
(log) No. employees 0.147*** 0.0989*** 0.0722*** 0.0631*** 0.118***
(0.00447) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0123)
(log) capital intensity 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.0850*** 0.0830*** 0.104***
(0.00242) (0.00699) (0.00697) (0.00721) (0.00881)
age 0.00242*** 0.000539 1.13e-05 0.00242** 0.00272***
(0.000362) (0.000991) (0.000819) (0.00100) (0.00103)
mne 0.162*** 0.154*** 0.269*** 0.220*** 0.370***
(0.0172) (0.0353) (0.0359) (0.0616) (0.136)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.136*** 4.338*** 4.582*** 4.589*** 4.222***
(0.0180) (0.0673) (0.0694) (0.101) (0.154)
Observations 65,826 7,555 7,392 7,255 6,733
R-squared 0.139 0.121 0.125 0.107 0.175
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6.4 Robustness Check 3: A New Algorithm to Identify the
Individual Shareholders and Results
Although there is no information on the ownership type in the original data, we make
some further attempts to identify the possible ownership links by non-companies such
as individuals, families or states through a new algorithm. In the main text, we do
not differentiate between the ultimate beneficial owners and the parent companies,
which results in some groups belonging to type (a) in Figure 5 being treated as
type (c). The new algorithm first identifies all the nodes with no inward link to the
groups where there is at least one Italian company or non-company.18 If they have
shareholder data in the original ORBIS database but with only minority shareholders
or their BvD ID number can be found in AIDA, we can confirm that they are the
parent companies. Otherwise, we check the number of outward links they have. If
they have more than 1 outward link, we assume that they are individual or family
ultimate beneficial owners who control multiple companies (see type (b) in Figure
5); thus, the group size of type (b) is 1 less than the previous measure. If they have
only 1 outward link, we assume that they are the ultimate controlling shareholder
of the parent company (see type (a)). We then remove their links to the parent
company and recompute the centrality and the other network measures for the firms
belonging to groups of type (a). Some groups of size 2 are thus divided into two
disconnected nodes, and the firms used to be part of such groups are excluded from
the sample. We finally derive a new sample of 183,177 Italian firms that belong to
corporate groups. Nevertheless, the main regression results of the new algorithm and
the previous one in this chapter are generally consistent (see details in Table 12 and
Table 13). It should be noted that this new algorithm may mistakenly drop some
ownership links by companies or institutions whose shareholder data are not covered
by ORBIS. The results reported here aim only to provide further support for our
findings in this paper.
18The BvD ID number in ORBIS provides the nationality information of an entity or individual.
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Figure 5: Three Cases of Corporate Groups’ Ownership Structure
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Table 12: Regression Results of Centrality and Corporate Group Size
Dependent variable: 3-year average sales growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth Sales growth
ownership level -0.00408 -0.00558* -0.00420 0.00319
(0.00258) (0.00287) (0.00283) (0.00297)
centrality 0.0351*** 0.0530*** 0.0520*** 0.0551***
(0.00509) (0.00817) (0.00817) (0.00875)
(log) No. firms 0.00444 0.00664** 0.00664** 0.00687**
(0.00301) (0.00334) (0.00273) (0.00283)
PI 0.0386*** 0.0342*** 0.0193* 0.0160 0.0130
(0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0116)
diameter 0.00204 0.00245** 0.00185
(0.00142) (0.00121) (0.00137)
(log) No. employees 0.0488*** 0.0469*** 0.0469*** 0.0480*** 0.0457*** 0.0457*** 0.0458***
(0.00247) (0.00268) (0.00269) (0.00246) (0.00268) (0.00268) (0.00269)
(log) capital intensity 0.00429*** 0.00442*** 0.00451*** 0.00355*** 0.00364*** 0.00371*** 0.00374***
(0.000990) (0.00108) (0.00108) (0.000994) (0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109)
(log) sales 2014 -0.0655*** -0.0623*** -0.0622*** -0.0660*** -0.0629*** -0.0628*** -0.0629***
(0.00231) (0.00252) (0.00252) (0.00232) (0.00253) (0.00252) (0.00252)
mne 0.0336*** 0.0304*** 0.0355*** 0.0291*** 0.0258*** 0.0312*** 0.0306***
(0.00522) (0.00579) (0.00538) (0.00532) (0.00588) (0.00546) (0.00550)
age -0.00112*** -0.00112*** -0.00112*** -0.00120*** -0.00120*** -0.00120*** -0.00120***
(0.000129) (0.000150) (0.000149) (0.000132) (0.000153) (0.000153) (0.000153)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.473*** 0.444*** 0.446*** 0.469*** 0.446*** 0.450*** 0.448***
(0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157)
Observations 82,597 64,662 64,662 82,601 64,662 64,662 64,662
R-squared 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.033
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Regression Results of Subsamples by Corporate Group Sizes
Dependent variable: 3-year (2014-2016) average sales growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Size 3-5 Size 6-7 Size 8-13 Size 14-50 Size 50+
centrality 0.0680*** 0.0401 0.0281 0.0664* 0.0124
(0.00987) (0.0259) (0.0252) (0.0359) (0.0457)
PI 0.0232* -0.0290 0.00284 0.0243 0.200
(0.0123) (0.0443) (0.0642) (0.0987) (0.269)
(log) No. employees 0.0474*** 0.0508*** 0.0328*** 0.0343*** 0.0427***
(0.00365) (0.00937) (0.00886) (0.00832) (0.00619)
(log) capital intensity 0.00335** 0.00521 0.00150 0.00433 0.00385
(0.00147) (0.00353) (0.00326) (0.00329) (0.00271)
(log) sales 2014 -0.0705*** -0.0646*** -0.0462*** -0.0544*** -0.0495***
(0.00330) (0.00919) (0.00823) (0.00890) (0.00607)
age -0.00146*** -0.000918** -0.000811* -0.000683 -0.000932**
(0.000173) (0.000468) (0.000449) (0.000422) (0.000466)
mne 0.0212*** 0.0215 -0.00388 0.0352* 0.0809***
(0.00815) (0.0158) (0.0138) (0.0183) (0.0310)
sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.510*** 0.473*** 0.350*** 0.397*** 0.259***
(0.0204) (0.0577) (0.0492) (0.0598) (0.0525)
Observations 42,479 5,239 5,478 5,838 5,628
R-squared 0.039 0.036 0.021 0.032 0.029
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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